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Introduction 
Most of the response brief addresses issues that are not in dispute on 
appeal. The issues on appeal are (i) whether Okland considered the California 
vacation house his principal domicile during the 42 days he spent there from 
February 17, 2011, to April1, 2011; (ii) whether 42 days in a common abode is 
more than a "temporary or brief period of time" under the test for cohabitation; 
and (iii) whether the cohabitation statute requires that cohabitation be ongoing to 
terminate alimony. The response brief barely addresses those three issues. 
Instead, the response brief devotes considerable space to describing the 
sexual relationship betweenJillian and Okland. (Resp.Br. at 8-10, 12-14.) But as 
the panel noted, it is undisputed that Jillian and Okland had a "relatively 
permanent sexual relationship." Scott v. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ,-r 10, 368 P.3d 133 
("' Op.") Jillian did not challenge that ruling before the panel and does not 
challenge it here. Those sections of the response brief are beside the point. 
The response brief also devotes considerable space to describing the 
various vacations Jillian and Okland took prior to February 17, 2011. (Resp.Br. at 
8-11, 49.) But the panel reversed the trial court's ruling that cohabitation began 
before February 17. (Op. ,-r 38.) Bradley did not file a cross-petition to challenge 
that holding. The vacations before February 17 also are beside the point. 
The response brief also repeatedly accuses Jillian of challenging findings of 
fact, an accusation presented to and rejected by the panel. (Op. ,-r 8.) Because the 
1 
trial court did not find that Okland considered the California vacation house to 
be his principal residence, let alone his principal domicile, there is no need to 
challenge a finding of fact on that point. And because the trial court considered 
whether 144 days-not the 42 days now at issue-constitutes umore than a 
temporary or brief period of time," there is no finding to challenge on that point 
either. The issues presented are questions of law, not questions of fact. 
When the response brief does address the issues presented, it advances 
arguments that ignore the panel decision and controlling precedent. Bradley 
asserts in two sentences that the panel should not have addressed Jillian' s 
argument that the statute requires cohabitation to be ongoing to terminate 
alimony. (Resp.Br. at 50.) Bradley does not address the panel's explanation of 
why it addressed the issue and does not provide any factual or legal analysis as 
to why the panel erred in addressing it. Bradley has inadequately briefed the 
issue and this court should disregard it. Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, 
L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, ~ 11,279 P.3d 391 (courts have udiscretion to not address an 
inadequately briefed argument'' (internal quotation marks omitted)). Bradley's 
assertion is also contrary to precedent, which allows appellate courts to address a 
controlling statute governing the issue presented. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 
68, ~ 11,266 P.3d 828 ("'Our preservation rule does not prevent [an appellant] 
from arguing the applicability of ... controlling authority that directly bears 
th . ") upon e ISsue.... . 
2 
The three issues presented in the opening brief are therefore both legal in 
nature and squarely presented. And each one provides a ground to reverse. 
Domicile- To terminate alimony, the trial court had to rule that the 
California vacation house was the principal domicile for Jillian and Okland. But 
the trial court did not find that it was Okland' s principal domicile, or even his 
principal residence. As the trial court recognized in its findings of fact, the only 
evidence was to the contrary: "Mr. Okland testified Rancho Santa Fe was not 
intended to be his primary residence and he returned to Salt Lake City on or 
about April1, 2011 and broke up with [Jillian]." (R. 2255.) Because the California 
vacation house was never Okland' s principal domicile or residence, Bradley did 
not satisfy the test for cohabitation. 
Brief Period of Time - Even if there had been cohabitation, the 
cohabitation had to last for more than a temporary or brief period of time. Here, 
the panel opinion reversed the trial court's ruling that cohabitation began in 
December 2010 and lasted 144 days. (R. 2272; Op. ~ 15.) The panel instead held 
that cohabitation began on February 17, 2011, which was 42 days before Okland 
ended the relationship on April1, 2011. (Op. ~ 15.) In all other jurisdictions, 42 
days is not nearly long enough for cohabitation to terminate alimony. This court 
should clarify that Utah requires cohabitation to last for at least a few months to 
constitute a relationship capable of replacing the financial need for alimony. 
3 
Ongoing Cohabitation - Even if there had been cohabitation and the 
cohabitation had lasted for more than a temporary or brief period of time, any 
cohabitation ended well before Bradley filed his petition and "established'' 
cohabitation. Jillian argued that the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) requires 
cohabitation to be ongoing to terminate alimony. The response brief does not 
argue that the language is ambiguous or that an exception to enforcing the plain 
language applies. Because Bradley failed to address the issue, this court may 
reverse on that ground. Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ~ 11 (affirming because appellee 
failed to address appellant's arguments). 
Instead of addressing the plain language of section 30-3-5(10), Bradley 
mentions the cohabitation test in three other states. But a comparison to other 
states only provides support for enforcing the plain language. Thirty-six states 
require that the cohabitation change the recipient's economic status, like a new 
job. Another four states terminate alimony only if the recipient cohabitates for a 
time period specified by statute, the shortest of which is 90 days- more than 
double the 42 days here. These statutes demonstrate that a rational legislator 
could have intended to require ongoing cohabitation to terminate alimony under 
section 30-3-5(10). Because Bradley has not shown how the absurdity doctrine 
precludes enforcing the plain language, this court should require ongoing 
cohabitation to terminate alimony. Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ~ 31, --- P.3d ---. 
This court can reverse on any of those three grounds. 
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Argument 
In what follows, Jillian first demonstrates that she is not challenging 
findings of fact, for the reasons recognized by the court of appeals. Jillian then 
replies to Bradley's arguments that address the issues presented on appeal. 
1. Jillian is not challenging findings of fact 
The opening brief and the panel addressed questions of law. (Op.Br. at 
2,3,39-42).1 The response brief nonetheless discusses findings of fact, most of 
which concern a time period no longer relevant (before February 17) and factual 
issues no longer in dispute (the sexual relationship). (Resp.Br. at 8-10,12-14,29-
35.) Jillian is not challenging those findings because they are legally irrelevant. 
As for the standard of review, Myers II governs. Under Myers II, certain 
challenged findings are "pure findings of fact subject to clearly erroneous review. 
But some of those findings [are] premised on embedded questions of law, which 
are reviewed for correctness." Myers v. Myers (Myers II), 2011 UT 65, ,-r 34,266 
P.3d 806. Myers II explained that" a misconception of the governing legal 
standard," such as the failure to understand "[t]he impact of common residency 
and of a sexual relationship on the determination of cohabitation are questions of 
law on which no deference is due, since they do not I call for proof' but rather for 
I argument."' I d. ,-r 36. 
1 At the end of the opening brief, it was important to Jillian to clarify certain 
facts, but she stated that those facts are immaterial:" Although immaterial under 
the correct legal standard, it is worth correcting a few factual errors in the panel 
opinion." (Op.Br. at 39 (emphasis added).) 
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As Jillian explained in her opening briefs in this court and the court of 
appeals, the district court misconceived the test for cohabitation. The panel 
agreed that the issues presented questions of law. (Op. ~ 8.) And because the 
issues addressed by the panel were questions of law, and this court reviews the 
panel's opinion for correctness, the issues here present questions of law. Most of 
the response brief addresses findings of fact that are neither at issue nor relevant. 
2. The response brief does not address the finding that Okland did not 
consider the California house to be his principal residence or explain 
why this court said "domicile" but meant something other than domicile 
For over thirty years, this court's cohabitation test has been stable: two 
parties cohabitate "'only if they establish a common abode that both parties 
consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of 
time" and have a sexual relationship. Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ~~ 16-17 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The panel changed this test. It held that this court did 
not mean domicile by"' domicile," but instead meant residence. (Op. ~ 18.) 
But even if this court used "'principal domicile" to mean principal 
residence, this court still should reverse because the trial court did not find that 
the California home was Okland' s principal residence or his principal domicile. 
The only finding of fact that addresses the issue says the opposite: "'Mr. Okland 
testified Rancho Santa Fe was not intended to be his primary residence and he 
returned to Salt Lake City on or about April1, 2011 and broke up with [Jillian] ." 
(R.2255.) Based upon this finding of fact, Bradley is incorrect that the trial court 
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was "entitled to find that [Okland's] domicile was Rancho Santa Fe." (Resp.Br. at 
46.) The trial court did not make that finding, and in light of the findings it did 
make, it was not entitled to do so. 
Bradley also asserts, without citation to the record, that Okland 
"represented that he lived with Ms. Scott on a full time permanent basis." (I d. at 
46.) That was not Okland's testimony. And if Bradley bases that assertion on 
Okland' s application for membership at a golf course in California, in which he 
indicated that Ms. Scott should have "family status" privileges, that fact has 
nothing to do with whether the California house was Okland' s principal 
domicile or residence. There is no record basis for finding that the California 
house was Okland' s principal domicile, which is why that finding is absent. 
Otherwise, Bradley asserts that Okland transported personal items and 
possessions to the California house. (Id. at 46.) But this not only finds scant 
support in the record, it also, as explained on pages 39-41 of the opening brief, 
does not show that Okland intended the California house to be his principal 
domicile or residence, especially in light of the finding of fact that says that the 
California house "was not intended to be his primary residence." (R.2255.) 
For those reasons, even if the panel were correct that this court used the 
word "domicile" to mean residence, the record and findings indicate that the 
California house was not Okland' s principal residence. This court can reverse on 
that ground alone without clarifying whether "domicile" means domicile. 
7 
But this court should clarify that "domicile" means domicile in the test for 
cohabitation, which is its meaning in every other legal context. In doing so, this 
court should reject how Bradley and the panel read its prior cases. 
2.1 The panel opinion conflicts with Haddow, Knuteson, and Myers II 
Bradley ignores the language used by this court for decades and 
characterizes Jillian' s argument concerning domicile as "Ms. Scott's 1 domicile' 
test," (Resp.Br. at 45) and "the 1 one-domicile' formulation that Ms. Scott 
proposes." (Id. at 43.) But Jillian is not asking this court to begin using the word 
"domicile" in its cohabitation test. This court has used the word for decades, in 
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387 
(Utah 1980), and Myers II. 
At times recognizing the problem, Bradley states that the test is intended 
to be "flexible." (Resp.Br. at 43.) While the overall test is flexible, the element that 
requires domicile is no more or less flexible than it is in other legal contexts. To 
conclude otherwise, Bradley, like the panel, misreads this court's decisions in 
Haddow, Knuteson, and Myers II. 
Bradley describes Haddow as follows: "In Haddow, for example-where the 
couple each maintained a separate home-this Court did not engage in a 
formulistic test to determine which of the two homes the couple's true domicile 
was and then determine whether the couple shared that home. Rather, this Court 
focused on whether the couple lived together in either one or both of the two 
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homes in a marriage-like arrangement." (Resp.Br. at 42-43.) This is not accurate. 
In Haddow, only the ex-wife's house was in question. 707 P.2d at 670-71. There 
was no dispute that it was her domicile. Id. at 670. The only question was 
whether it was also the boyfriend's domicile. Id. at 671-72. This court held that 
J'J'the common residency element of cohabitation has not been established" 
because neither the ex-wife nor the boyfriend considered the home to be the 
boyfriend's "principal residence." Id. at 674. The court therefore held that the 
couple was not cohabitating. Id. 
Bradley also misreads Knuteson. Bradley describes Knuteson as J'J' another 
case where two homes were involved, [and] this Court did not employ Ms. 
Scott's i one-home' analysis. Rather, the question was whether the couple's living 
arrangements were akin to a marriage." (Resp.Br. at 43.) This also is not accurate. 
In Knuteson, the court determined that the couple was not cohabitating because 
J'J'Mrs. Knuteson was not a iresident' in [her boyfriend's] home in the statutory 
sense." 619 P.2d at 1389. That sentence not only demonstrates that this court 
concluded Mrs. Knuteson was not a resident, it confirms that the court intends 
the words to be used J'J'in their statutory sense," and not in a vague and J'J'flexible" 
way that parties cannot predict or apply to their circumstances without litigation. 
Bradley also misreads Myers II. He describes it as holding J'J' that the 
i common residency' element was not met because the couple's living 
arrangements did not resemble those of a married couple- for example, 
9 
Ms. Myers slept on the couch while M.H. had a separate room, they shared no 
common household duties or expenses, and the nature of their sexual 
relationship was likewise not permanene' (Resp.Br. at 44.) But in Myers II, the 
divorced woman was living with her parents, who were housing a foster teen. 
2011 UT 65, ~ 1. The two may have had a sexual relationship. Id. ~ 4. And 
because they also lived in the same house, this court assumed the two threshold 
elements of the test (common residency and sexual relationship) were satisfied. 
I d. ~ 22. This court concluded the parties were not cohabiting. The court wrote 
that 11 [e]ven ifMs. Myers and [the foster teen] had a sexual relationship and lived 
together under the same roof, their relationship had almost none of the other 
hallmarks of a marriage." Id. ~ 39 (emphasis added). In other words, Myers II did 
not conclude, as Bradley asserts, that II the couple's living arrangements did not 
resemble those of a married couple." (Resp.Br. at 44.) It assumed that the living 
arrangements did resemble that of a married couple but still held that the 
relationship was not like that of a married couple. 
In short, Bradley's statement that the test for cohabitation is flexible, while 
certainly correct in general, does not entail that this court's use of the term 
"domicile" means something other than domicile or is more flexible than it is in 
other legal contexts. The term does not refer to the nature of the parties' sexual 
relationship. It means domicile, just as it does in all other legal contexts. And this 
court's case law does not hold otherwise. 
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2.2 The panel erred when it defined "domicile" differently in this 
context than in all other legal contexts 
Bradley also asserts that ~~domicile" means something different in the test 
for cohabitation than in every other legal context. (Resp.Br. at 43.) But the case 
law confirms that the traditional domicile requirement remains part of the test. 
Myers II refers to the ~~notion of 'common residency'" in Bustamante v. 
Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1982). Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ~ 35 & n.7. In 
Bustamante, the court defined the term ~~residency" in the divorce context with 
reference to the following factors: ~~voting, owning property, paying taxes, 
having family in the area, maintaining a mailing address, being born or raised in 
the area, working or operating a business, and having children attend school in 
the forum." 645 P.2d at 41. This is not a special test for the divorce context. 
At times recognizing the problem with his position, Bradley also asserts 
that the word~~ domicile" itself is problematic, even though it has operated in 
legal contexts for centuries. (Resp.Br. at 43.) His support is a dissenting opinion 
written by Justice Frankfurter in 1939, which observes that the term~~ domicile" is 
problematic when applied to the wealthy. (Id. at45 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306 
U.S. 398,429 (1939)). But the majority disagreed, and pointed out that every 
person can have only one domicile that, once established, remains that person's 
domicile until affirmatively changed. Texas, 306 U.S. at 424-25. It is not clear how 
the dissenting opinion in a United States Supreme Court case decided nearly 70 
11 
years ago is relevant to what this court means by the term 11 domicile" in its test 
for cohabitation.2 
In short, Bradley provides no reason, either in this court's case law or in 
the dissenting opinions of other courts, to conclude that this court used the term 
11 domicile" to mean anything other than domicile. Even though there is no 
evidence, or finding, that Okland considered the California home to be his 
principal domicile or principal residence, this court should clarify that 
II domicile" means domicile, not residence. Either way, this court should reverse. 
3. The response brief does not explain how ''temporary or brief period of 
time" refers to a state of mind 
The phrase 11 temporary or brief period of time" concerns the duration of 
cohabitation, not the state of mind of those cohabitating. Bradley and the panel 
assert otherwise and obscure the test. (Op. ,-r 22.) 
In response, Bradley does not address whether 42 days is more than a 
temporary or brief period of time. Instead, he characterizes Jillian' s position as 
follows: 11 couples should be given a trial-period to determine whether their 
2 In a footnote, Bradley raises various concerns about using the definition of 
11 domicile" in the cohabitation context. He refers to it as an II artificial 'one-home-
maximum' test," and cites concerns that II a couple who traveled for a living, or 
who transferred frequently, or who were in the military, or who do not have a 
steady home, could never qualify as 'cohabitating."' (Resp.Br. at 45 & n.11.) 
These concerns are a mirage. They are the same concerns that arise in any other 
context involving domicile and can be resolved in the same way: a multi-factor 
test in which domicile changes only when the person abandons their old 
domicile, establishes a new one, and demonstrates an intent to remain. O'Rourke 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 830 P.2d 230, 232 n.l (Utah 1992). Applying the 
traditional test for domicile is no more difficult or troublesome in this context 
than in any other legal context. 
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marriage-like-living arrangement will work." (Resp.Br. at 46.) But that is 
demonstrably correct under the current test. Living in the common abode for 
only a temporary or brief period of time is not sufficient under the test. It takes 
more than a temporary or brief period of time for cohabitation. The question is 
what constitutes more than a temporary or brief period of time, and Bradley's 
observation that parties have a trial period unless a single day is enough to 
terminate alimony does not address the issue. 
And this court already has explained how to answer this question. This 
court has long maintained that '"[c]ohabitation is not a sojourn, nor a habit of 
visiting, nor even remaining with for a time; the term implies continuity."' Myers 
II, 2011 UT 65, ~ 26 (quoting Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673). And while Bradley is 
correct that Knuteson and Haddow address the issue further, he is incorrect that 
those cases refer to a state of mind rather than a period of time. 
As to Knuteson, Bradley relies on the same incorrect interpretation set forth 
by the panel. (Resp.Br. at 47; Op. ~ 23.) He states that the court in Knuteson 
"found it significant that neither the ex-wife nor neighbor' consider[ ed]' the 
neighbors' [sic] home to be the ex-wife's 'principle [sic] domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time."' (Resp.Br. at 47.) But Mrs. Knuteson was not a 
""resident' .... in the statutory sense," confirming that the ordinary meanings of 
words should be applied. Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389. This court also held "that 
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the wording of the statute does not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's 
home." I d. Bradley's characterization is incorrect. 
Bradley also incorrectly reads Haddow. He states that Haddow n asked 
whether an alimony recipient's time spent in boyfriend's home amounted to 
cohabitation." (Resp.Br. at 48.) But Haddow held that the boyfriend was never a 
"resident" in the ex-wife's home. 707 P.2d at 673. The question was not how long 
he was a resident. The case law does not support Bradley's novel test. 
3.1 No other jurisdiction has terminated alimony on the basis of 
cohabitation that lasted 42 days 
Bradley at times suggests that allowing couples a ntrial period" would be 
absurd. (Resp.Br. at 46.) He states, n[a]ccording to ITillian], couples should be 
given a trial-period to determine whether their marriage-like-living arrangement 
will work" (I d. at 46.) He turns to South Carolina's statute, which expressly 
states that alimony may be terminated if the couple lives together for /If ninety or 
more consecutive days."' (Id. at 47.) It is worth noting that South Carolina gives 
couples a ntrial period" of eighty-nine days-more than twice as long as the 
period here. Even more revealing, however, is what all the states Bradley omits 
say about how long a couple must cohabitate to terminate alimony. 
The clear majority of states- thirty-six- do not consider cohabitation to be 
an event that automatically terminates alimony. Twelve states by statute allow 
the modification or termination of alimony based on cohabitation, but only if the 
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recipient's financial circumstances have changed, much like getting a new job.3 
Twenty-four states have the same rule, but the rule developed in the case law.4 
What these thirty-six states have in common is an appreciation that alimony is an 
economic arrangement that changes only if the recipient's economic status has 
changed. Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & 
Fam. Stud. 289 (2011) (reviewing various approaches to cohabitation in a variety 
of settings). 
3 Cal. Fam. Code§ 4323(a)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-86(b); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 13, § 1512; Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 61.14(b)(1); Ga. Code Ann.§ 19-6-19(b); Iowa 
Code Ann.§ 598.21c(1); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 208, § 49(d); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 
452.370(1); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 248; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 134(C); Tenn. Code 
Ann.§ 36-5-121(£)(2)(B); W.Va. Code Ann.§ 48-5-707(a)(1). 
4 Smith v. Mangum, 747 P.2d 609, 611 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating majority 
rule that "courts modify the amount of spousal maintenance received by the 
cohabiting ex-spouse only if the spouse's support needs have changed"); see also 
Musgrove v. Musgrove, 821 P.2d 1366,1370 (Alaska 1991); In reMarriage of Dwyer, 
825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991); Amii v. Amii, 695 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1985); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39,43 (Ind. 1990); Block v. Block, 252 
S.W.3d 156, 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); Whittington 1}. Whittington, 914 A.2d 212, 226 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); Ianitelli v. Ianitelli, 502 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993); Sieber v. Sieber, 258 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1977); Alexis v. Tarver, 879 So. 
2d 1078,1080 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); In reMarriage of Bross, 845 P.2d 728,731-32 
(Mont. 1993); Else v. Else, 367 N.W.2d 701,704 (Neb. 1985); Gilman v. Gilman, 956 
P.2d 761, 764 (Nev. 1998); Bisig v. Bisig, 469 A.2d 1348, 1350 (N.H. 1983); Gayet v. 
Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983); Cherpelis v. Cherpelis, 1996-NMCA-037, 121 
N.M. 500, ~ 6, 914 P.2d 637, 638; Bussey v. Bussey, 563 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1988); In reMarriage of Morrison, 910 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); 
Goldman v. Goldman, 543 A.2d 1304,1306-07 (R.I. 1988); Moore v. Moore, 2009 S.D. 
16, ~ 22, 763 N.W.2d 536; Miller v. Miller, 2005 VT 122, ~ 18, 179 Vt. 147, 892 A.2d 
175; In reMarriage of Tower, 780 P.2d 863, 867 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Taake v. 
Taake, 233 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Wis. 1975); Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, ~ 8, 90 P.3d 
739 (Wyo. 2004). 
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Only twelve states terminate alimony if the recipient cohabitates, 
regardless of whether her economic status has changed.s Of those, four states 
specify by statute the length of cohabitation required. As Bradley indicated, 
South Carolina is such a state, requiring cohabitation for at least ninety days. The 
other three states require that cohabitation last more than a year to terminate 
alimony. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A § 951-A(12) (requiring cohabitation to have 
existed for at least 12 months out of 18 consecutive months); N.D. Cent. Code 
Ann.§ 14-05-24.1(3) (one year); Va. Code Ann.§ 20-109(A) (one year). 
The statutes in Utah and seven other states allow the courts to define what 
constitutes a sufficient length of time for cohabitation to terminate alimony. Ala. 
Code§ 30-2-55; Ark Code Ann.§ 9-12-312(a)(2); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/510(c); La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 115; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 50-16.9(b); 23 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3706; Tex. Fam. Code Ann.§ 8.056(b). In those states, Jillian 
has found no case terminating alimony based upon cohabitation that lasted 42 
days or fewer, except a few cases more than three decades old where the 
cohabitation was stable and continuing. See, e.g., Roofe v. Roofe, 460 N.E.2d 784, 
785 (Ill. App. 1984). 
The shortest period Jillian has found is nine weeks- fifty percent longer 
than the 42 days at issue here. Lobaugh v. Lobaugh, 753 A.2d 834, 837 (Pa. Super. 
s Two other states, Idaho and Kansas, rely primarily on a contract between the 
parties. Foster v. Schorr, 82 P.3d 845 (Idaho 2003); In reMarriage of Kuzanek, 105 
P.3d 1253 (Kan. 2005). 
16 
Ct. 2000). Most states require cohabitation for many months, which is consistent 
with this court's holding in in Knuteson that two months and ten days was "a 
temporary stay." 619 P.2d at 1389; Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672 (describing Knuteson 
as holding that "a stay of two months and ten days did not establish a 'settled 
abode'"). 
In other words, far from being absurd, giving couples a "trial period to 
determine whether their marriage-like-living arrangement will work" is the 
rational position adopted by every state. It is consistent with the policy 
underlying alimony, which concerns the recipient's economic needs. It is 
consistent with a policy of encouraging recipients to pursue new romantic 
relationships without fear of financial repercussions. This court should reverse 
the panel's decision, which appears to be the only decision in the country 
terminating alimony where cohabitation had ended and lasted only 42 days. 
3.2 Jillian and Okland were not in the California house for .1/more 
than a temporary or brief period of time" 
Rather than addressing the 42 days of cohabitation found by the panel, 
Bradley asserts that the cohabitation lasted longer. Bradley states that Jillian lived 
in the California house for approximately eighty-seven days and that this is the 
relevant time period. (Resp.Br. at 49.) But whenever the time period began, it 
ended on April1, when Okland ended the relationship. (Op.Br. at 36.) It is 
difficult to understand how parties can continue to satisfy the test for 
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cohabitation after one party-here, Okland- ends their relationship and no 
longer lives in the same state, let alone the same house. Bradley never explains. 
Bradley instead suggests that the panel 11 erred in limiting the time of 
cohabitation to six weeks," but should have looked to the relationship before that 
time. (Resp.Br. at 49.) In essence, Bradley assumes that the trial court was correct 
in ruling that cohabitation began in December 2010, the very ruling reversed by 
the panel in its opinion when it held that cohabitation could not have begun until 
February 17, 2011. (Op. ~ 15.) Bradley could have cross-petitioned to challenge 
the holding by the panel, but did not. Utah R. App. P. 47. It is therefore not 
before this court. Bradley's challenge to the panel's decision is also inadequately 
briefed and insufficient to overturn the panel decision. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
In short, this court should reject the panel's holding that 42 days of 
cohabitation is sufficient to terminate alimony. This court should clarify that 
cohabitation must last at least ninety days- the shortest period that terminates 
alimony in other states. This court should reverse the order terminating Jillian' s 
alimony and order the trial court to reinstate alimony and order back pay. 
4. This court should enforce the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) 
This court also should reverse because cohabitation was not ongoing, a 
requirement under the plain language of the statute. The cohabitation statute 
uses the present tense verb: II Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that 
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the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) 
(emphasis added). In the opening brief, Jillian argued that the plain language of 
the statute required cohabitation to be ongoing and did not violate the absurdity 
doctrine. In response, Bradley ignores both. 
4.1 Bradley incorrectly asserts that this court should not address the 
argument because it is not preserved 
In one sentence, Bradley asserts that the argument concerning the plain 
language of the statute was not preserved and the panel should not have 
addressed it. (Resp.Br. at 50.) He has not adequately briefed the issue; nor could 
he. "Issues must be preserved, not arguments for or against a particular ruling on 
an issue raised below." Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ~ 45,323 P.3d 998 
(emphasis in original); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ~ 26 n. 23, --- P.3d ---. 
The issue of cohabitation was preserved. 
Moreover, the panel addressed the question, having determined it was 
essential to interpretation of the statute. (Op. ~ 27 n. 8.) The paneY s approach 
adheres to Patterson v. Patterson, in which this court held it would not disregard 
an unpreserved but controlling statutory argument. 2011 UT 68, ~ 20, 266 P.3d 
828. This court reviews the panel decision for correctness. Here, the panel 
decision is contrary to the plain language of the statute. This court should review 
that decision and enforce the plain language. 
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4.2 Bradley's brief fails to confront the plain language of section 30-3-
5(10) and should be disregarded under Broderick 
Bradley fails to address the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) and the 
issues presented in the opening brief. An appellee's brief must address the issues 
presented in the opening brief. Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 
2012 UT 17, ~ 10,279 P.3d 391. If it "fail[s] to address or refute [the appellant's] 
points," it may be disregarded. Id. ~ 14. 
Bradley paraphrases the statutory language and, in doing so, changes its 
meaning, a move that acknowledges he loses under the plain language. Bradley 
asserts that the statute says, "cohabitation automatically terminates alimony 
upon a finding of cohabitation regardless of whether the couple eventually 
separates or terminates their cohabitation." (Resp.Br. at 51.) The language 
actually says, "Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is cohabitating with another person." Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) 
(emphasis added). Bradley does not argue that the language is ambiguous, 
because it is not ambiguous.6 The plain language therefore governs. 
6 Oddly, Bradley quotes legislative history that confirms the plain-language 
interpretation that requires ongoing cohabitation: mlf someone really is 
cohabitating, they are living with another person in that companionship 
relationship that is at least commensurate with marriage, then alimony ought to 
stop .... If they are in a substitute marriage relationship, alimony ought to 
end."' (Resp.Br. at 36 (quoting 51st Legislature, Utah House of Representative, 
Floor Debate, Tape No.1 (January 23,1995 morning session).) 
20 
The opening brief also explained that the plain language governs unless, 
under the absurdity doctrine, ''no rational legislator could have intended" the 
statute to mean what it says. Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75,, 46,375 
P.2d 992. This court confirmed that approach in Bagley v. Bagley, and concluded 
that "[a]bsent an overwhelmingly absurd result, we will not modify the 
statutes." 2016 UT 48, ,, 27-29, 31. Jillian explained that a rational legislator 
could have intended the statute to require ongoing cohabitation to replace the 
need for alimony before alimony can be terminated. (Op.Br. at 18.) She addressed 
supportive and relevant policy considerations under the absurdity doctrine. (Id.) 
Bradley does not mention the absurdity doctrine. He instead cites to a 
court of appeals case, Black v. Black, that does not squarely address the issue 
(Resp.Br. at 50, citing Black, 2008 UT App 465, , 8, 199 P.3d 371.) He also cites a 
theoretical consequence of reading the statute according to its plain language (i.e. 
that "one half of a couple could simply move out"). (Resp.Br. at 52-53.) Bradley's 
brief fails to confront this issue. 
This court should reverse. Bradley not only does not address the 
arguments in the opening brief, he also has not shown that an exception to 
enforcing plain language applies. Broderick, 2012 UT 17, , 10. 
4.2.1 The majority of other states also require cohabitation to 
be ongoing in order to justify termination of alimony 
Instead of addressing the plain language of Utah's statute, Bradley cites 
statutes in Connecticut, Florida, and Oklahoma for the unremarkable proposition 
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that some states have different statutes that operate differently. (Resp.Br. at 50-
51.) Bradley avoids mentioning states that interpret their statutes to require 
ongoing cohabitation. It is worth understanding why. 
A survey of other states sheds light on how rational legislators can address 
the termination of alimony. As explained above, thirty-six states allow for 
alimony to be adjusted on the basis of cohabitation only where the recipient's 
economic circumstances have changed as a result of the cohabitation. In these 
states, cohabitation is one of many other "changes in circumstances" that may 
justify a modification of alimony. In these states, a relationship that had ended 
would not support a modification of alimony because the recipient's economic 
circumstances would not have changed. And if alimony is terminated, but 
economic circumstances change again, a former recipient can petition to have 
alimony restored. The fact that Utah allows alimony to be restored only after a 
remarriage that is annulled suggests that it should be more difficult, not less 
difficult, to terminate alimony based upon cohabitation in the first instance? 
The statutes in other states are also revealing, as they disclose various 
approaches to terminating alimony based upon cohabitation. 
7 Oddly, Bradley asserts that the fact that alimony can be restored after the 
annulment of a marriage means it should be easier to terminate alimony based 
upon cohabitation. (Resp.Br. at 51-52.) Bradley never explains this 
counterintuitive assertion so Jillian does not address it further. 
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• Two states, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, allow for alimony to be 
terminated if the recipient nhas cohabited." LSA-C.C. Art. 115; 23 Pa. 
C.S.A. § 3706. 
• Five other states use the present tense in their cohabitation tests. Ala. 
Code 1975 § 30-2-55 (requiring termination if recipient ''is living 
openly or cohabiting"); Ark. Code Ann.§ 9-12-312(a)(2)(D)(Supp. 
2013) (requiring termination upon nliving full time with another 
person in an intimate, cohabitating relationship"); 750 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 5/510 (requiring termination nif the party receiving 
maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing 
conjugal basis"); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 50-16.9 (requiring 
termination if a party cohabitates, which nmeans the act of two 
adults dwelling together continuously and habitually"); Tex. Fam. 
Code Ann. § 8.056(b) (requiring termination if recipient n cohabits 
with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or romantic 
relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis"). 
• And four other states specify the duration of cohabitation to 
terminate alimony. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 19-A § 951-A(12) (2013); 
N.D. Cent. Code Ann.§ 14-05-24.1; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130; Va. 
Code Ann.§ 20-109. 
In those states with statutes that contemplate cohabitation will be ongoing, 
rational legislators intended that result. 
Regardless of what other states do, because a rational legislator could have 
intended the Utah statute to be read according to its plain language, this court 
should enforce the plain language. Utley, 2015 UT 75, ~~ 29, 46. As this court 
recently reaffirmed, n[a]bsent an overwhelmingly absurd result, [this court] will 
not modify the statutes." Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ~ 31. 
Bradley does not argue that no rational legislator could have intended that 
cohabitation be ongoing, but instead provides reasons why a rational legislator 
might disagree with that position, something that describes the possible 
23 
legislative options, but does not show the plain language here is absurd. Bradley 
asserts that "[i]f 'current cohabitation' were the test under the statute, then one 
half of a couple could simply move out any time a petition for termination is 
filed." (Resp.Br. at 52-53.) But there is no evidence this is a problem in any state. 
Courts are free to deny relief "when the offending conduct ceases and the court 
finds that there is no reasonable expectation that it will resume." Am. Express 
Travel Related Servs. Co. v. MasterCard Int'l Inc., 776 F. Supp. 787, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the offending conduct is likely 
to resume, perhaps courts could terminate alimony, as the court of appeals did in 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Regardless, Bradley has not shown what he must-that no rational 
legislator could have intended to require ongoing cohabitation with the plain 
language of section 30-3-5(10). This court should reverse. 
4.3 The three cases Bradley cites involve a boyfriend moving out to 
circumvent the litigation 
The three cases from other jurisdictions that Bradley cites in the response 
brief are also inapposite. (Resp. Br. at 52.) One case has been overturned, and the 
other two cases involved current boyfriends. 
Bradley first cites McRae v. McRae, 381 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1980). Bradley 
does not mention that the Mississippi Supreme Court revisited that decision in 
1994 and held that it improperly reflected "a moral judgment that a divorced 
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woman should not engage in sexual relations." Hammonds v. Hammonds, 641 
So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1994). McRae is not good law. 
Bradley next cites, J.N. v. M.N., an unpublished decision of the Family 
Court in Delaware. No. CN05-06443, 2007 WL 5361879 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 23, 
2007). In that case, the alimony recipient claimed that she was not cohabitating. 
Id. at *3. The trial court concluded she was cohabitating at the time the petition to 
terminate was filed. I d. at *8. After that, her boyfriend moved out, but the court 
appears to have found that was pretextual, as it was in Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161. 
Finally, Bradley cites In reMarriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. 
1994). In that case, the court held that the a totality of the evidence evinces a 
resident, conjugal relationship .... The fact that [the boyfriend] moved from the 
[ex-wife's] residence ... has little bearing on the continuing nature of the 
relationship. [The boyfriend] testified that he did so solely in response to the 
instant litigation .... [I]t is reasonable to presume he will resume coresidency 
when this litigation is terminated." Id. at 660. Frasco also is beside the point. 
There is no allegation, let alone evidence or a finding, that Okland ended 
the relationship on April1 as a pretext to prevent the termination of Bradley's 
alimony obligation. This court should reject any assertions to the contrary, 
enforce the plain language of the statute, and reverse on the ground that 
cohabitation ended long before Bradley either filed his petition or established 
cohabitation, assuming there was ever cohabitation under the Utah test. 
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Conclusion 
This court should reverse the panel opinion affirming the district court's 
termination of alimony. Jillian and Okland did not cohabitate under Utah law. 
The only finding is that Okland did not consider the California vacation house to 
be his principal domicile or even his principal residence. Even if he had, Jillian 
and Okland stayed together in the California house for only 42 days, which is not 
more than a 11 temporary or brief period of time." Finally, even if Jillian and 
Okland had cohabitated, their relationship ended months before Bradley filed his 
petition to terminate alimony and 11 established" cohabitation. Under the plain 
langue of section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code, the district court erred in 
terminating alimony where cohabitation was not ongoing. 
On any one of these grounds, this court should reverse and remand to 
allow Jillian to request her attorney fees once she becomes the prevailing party in 
these proceedings. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2016. 
ZIMMERMAN }ONES BOOHER 
~~-:;;, 
~~--::::~=~~?~:~~~ 
Michael '9?~errlian ~~-- - ---
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